A note on a group preference axiomatization with cardinal utility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2963445
Recommendations
- A foundation for Pareto aggregation
- The possibility of group choice: pairwise comparisons and merging functions
- Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5308074
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1143643
Cites work
- A Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility
- Aggregation of individuals' preference intensities into social preference intensity
- Group Decision Making Using Cardinal Social Welfare Functions
- Group decisions with multiple criteria
- Handbook of group decision and negotiation
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Transparent prioritisation, budgeting and resource allocation with multi-criteria decision analysis and decision conferencing
Cited in
(7)- Learning criteria weights of an optimistic Electre Tri sorting rule
- Properties underlying a preference aggregator based on satisficing logic
- Value of agreement in decision analysis: concept, measures and application
- Preference–Approval Structures in Group Decision Making: Axiomatic Distance and Aggregation
- Group decision making with incomplete information: a dominance and quasi‐optimality volume‐based approach using Monte‐Carlo simulation
- The possibility of group choice: pairwise comparisons and merging functions
- Levels of incomplete information in group decision models -- a comprehensive simulation study
This page was built for publication: A note on a group preference axiomatization with cardinal utility
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2963445)
