Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0730-6zbMath1291.91166OpenAlexW3123493589MaRDI QIDQ2247951

Sophie Bade

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6C93-F

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Consistent house allocation
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

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