Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.007zbMath1161.91373MaRDI QIDQ1021601

Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

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• The assignment game. I: The core
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• Incentives in Teams
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction