Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points
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Publication:2178011
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.01.001zbMATH Open1437.91036OpenAlexW2990454393WikidataQ126320696 ScholiaQ126320696MaRDI QIDQ2178011FDOQ2178011
Authors: F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Carlos Rafels, Neus Ybern
Publication date: 7 May 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/144180
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Cites Work
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- Becker's assortative assignments: Stability and fairness
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