Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

DOI10.1007/s11750-010-0170-8zbMath1267.91011OpenAlexW2059522439MaRDI QIDQ1948533

Oriol Tejada

Publication date: 23 April 2013

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0170-8

zbMATH Keywords

extreme pointscoreassignment gameshomogeneous goodsmultisided markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points ⋮ Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets ⋮ Resource location games

Cites Work

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• The supplier-firm-buyer game and its \(m\)-sided generalization
• Assignment games with stable core
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Multisided matching games with complementarities
• Cores of convex games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Böhm-Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis
• Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games

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