Profit-maximizing matchmaker
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.017zbMATH Open1279.91121OpenAlexW2089893178MaRDI QIDQ417692FDOQ417692
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.017
Recommendations
coreimplementationstrong Nash equilibriummenu auction gameresource allocation problemsimplified mechanismstable assignmenttwo-sided matching problem
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
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