Profit-maximizing matchmaker
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Publication:417692
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784577 (Why is no real title available?)
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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