Complexity and repeated implementation
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Publication:896948
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.002zbMath1330.91072MaRDI QIDQ896948
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256850
complexity; efficiency; mixed strategies; subgame perfect equilibrium; finite mechanisms; repeated implementation
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments, Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
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