Complexity and repeated implementation
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.002zbMATH Open1330.91072OpenAlexW2145764653MaRDI QIDQ896948FDOQ896948
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256850
Recommendations
efficiencycomplexitymixed strategiessubgame perfect equilibriumfinite mechanismsrepeated implementation
Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
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