Complexity and repeated implementation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.002MaRDI QIDQ896948zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jihong Lee, Hamid Sabourian

Publication date 15 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256850

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycomplexitymixed strategiessubgame perfect equilibriumfinite mechanismsrepeated implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Efficient repeated implementation
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• Repeated implementation
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Repeated implementation and complexity considerations

Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A crash course in implementation theory
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• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• The strength of a little perfection
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Efficient repeated implementation
• Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
• Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

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