Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2546zbMATH Open1073.91515OpenAlexW2058266084MaRDI QIDQ1806205FDOQ1806205

Authors: Sandro Brusco 

Publication date: 20 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2546

Recommendations

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
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• Some dynamics of signaling games
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
• Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games
• Sequential equilibria in signaling games
• Sequential equilibria in signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Bayesian Implementation
• Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments

Cited In (3)

• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments

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