Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0061-7MaRDI QIDQ868610zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tim Schulteis, Dries Vermeulen, Andres Perea, Hans Peters

Publication date 6 March 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1524250/guid-61cdfeb8-5f60-4dec-889e-a6b9991dba0f-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

preference conjecture equilibriumutility revision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Review text

The authors introduce the concept of a minimum revision equilibrium as a refinement of the sequential equilibrium in signaling games. A new concept of a preference conjecture equilibrium is defined under pertinent references.

Recommendations

• Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cites work

• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(7)

• A note on beliefs formation in signalling games
• Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
• Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games
• Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
• Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals
• Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games
• Preferences over location-scale family

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