Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXX002MaRDI QIDQ5210641zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Franke, José Pedro Correia

Publication date 21 January 2020

Published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(2)

• Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content
• Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives

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