Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXX002zbMATH Open1429.91071OpenAlexW2901750354MaRDI QIDQ5210641FDOQ5210641

Authors: Michael Franke, José Pedro Correia 

Publication date: 21 January 2020

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx002

Recommendations

• Ambiguity and context learning in signalling games
• The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games
• Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals
• Stochastic imitation in finite games
• Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games
• Some dynamics of signaling games
• Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games
• Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
• Signalling in IF games: a tricky business

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (2)

• Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives
• Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content

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