Support restrictions and sequential equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90063-9MaRDI QIDQ1092829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vicente Madrigal, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, Tommy Chin-Chiu Tan

Publication date 1987

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90063-9

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesinformation setsequential equilibriasupport of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Review text

We consider equilibrium concepts which require that the support of beliefs at an information set be contained in the supports of beliefs at preceding information sets. We analyze by means of an example why such equilibria often fail to exist in extensive form games. We find that support restrictions may exclude very salient equilibria.

Recommendations

• Sequential Equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs

Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information

Cited in

(5)

• Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
• Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
• Communication in bargaining over decision rights
• Information collection in bargaining
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling

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