Implementing action profiles when agents collude

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2235zbMath0872.90028OpenAlexW1974198676MaRDI QIDQ1357585

Sandro Brusco

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2235

zbMATH Keywords

collusion-proofprincipal multiple agents problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (4)

Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ The optimality of team contracts

Cites Work

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• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

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