Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1050zbMath0798.90148OpenAlexW1990516918MaRDI QIDQ1308816

Hideshi Itoh

Publication date: 25 October 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/37905

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcoalitionprincipal agentteam productionagent choicenon-transferable utilitiesside contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Observability and endogenous organizations ⋮ Collusion and discrimination in organizations ⋮ Implementing action profiles when agents collude ⋮ Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy ⋮ Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting ⋮ Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design ⋮ The organization of expertise in the presence of communication ⋮ A note on the optimal structure of production ⋮ Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design ⋮ Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference ⋮ Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard ⋮ Decentralization and collusion ⋮ Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard ⋮ The optimality of team contracts

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