Observability and endogenous organizations

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0959-2MaRDI QIDQ2358787zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Weerachart T. Kilenthong, Gabriel A. Madeira

Publication date 16 June 2017

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.pier.or.th/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/pier_dp_013.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumgroup regimeobservabilityorganizational designrelative performance regimevalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• Heterogeneity and risk sharing in village economies
• Observability and endogenous organizations
• Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research

Cited in

(6)

• Observability and endogenous organizations
• The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations
• Observability and incentive in organizations
• Technology driven organizational structure of the firm
• Incentives and peer effects in the workplace: on the impact of envy and wage transparency on organizational design
• Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design

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