Observability and endogenous organizations

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0959-2zbMath1404.91158OpenAlexW1495646291MaRDI QIDQ2358787

Gabriel A. Madeira, Weerachart T. Kilenthong

Publication date: 16 June 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.pier.or.th/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/pier_dp_013.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

observabilitygeneral equilibriumvalue of informationorganizational designgroup regimerelative performance regime

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

Observability and endogenous organizations

Cites Work

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• Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
• Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Observability and endogenous organizations
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• Heterogeneity and risk sharing in village economies

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