Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060392 (Why is no real title available?)
- A model in which outside and inside money are essential
- Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
- Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
- Heterogeneity and risk sharing in village economies
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
Cited in
(7)- Group lending with endogenous group size
- Observability and endogenous organizations
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- From natural variation to optimal policy? The importance of endogenous peer group formation
- Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
- Endowment effect in negotiations: group versus individual decision-making
- Introduction to monetary and macro economics
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