Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.03.007zbMATH Open1151.91654DBLPjournals/jet/MadeiraT08OpenAlexW1979456840WikidataQ33610098 ScholiaQ33610098MaRDI QIDQ951015FDOQ951015
Robert M. Townsend, Gabriel A. Madeira
Publication date: 29 October 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2811312
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Cites Work
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- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
- Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
- On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
- Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
- Heterogeneity and risk sharing in village economies
- Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (6)
- Group lending with endogenous group size
- Observability and endogenous organizations
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- From natural variation to optimal policy? The importance of endogenous peer group formation
- Endowment effect in negotiations: group versus individual decision-making
- Introduction to monetary and macro economics
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