Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.002MaRDI QIDQ308649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rene Saran

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

implementationbounded depths of rationalitycommon knowledge of rationalitycomplete informationmutual knowledge of rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Rationalizable implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
• A course in game theory.
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Exact implementation
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Identifying higher-order rationality
• Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Implementation with evidence
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Rationalizable implementation
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust trading mechanisms
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(15)

• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Rationality in the Full-Information Model
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-\(k\) rationality
• Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
• Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting
• Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality
• Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
• Information-theoretic bounded rationality and \(\epsilon\)-optimality
• Trait-augmented games with limited-skill agents

This page was built for publication: Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q308649)