Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
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Publication:308649
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.002zbMATH Open1371.91054OpenAlexW2434623774MaRDI QIDQ308649FDOQ308649
Authors: Rene Saran 
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002
Recommendations
implementationbounded depths of rationalitycommon knowledge of rationalitycomplete informationmutual knowledge of rationality
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Cited In (15)
- A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Rationality in the Full-Information Model
- Information-theoretic bounded rationality and \(\epsilon\)-optimality
- Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-\(k\) rationality
- Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting
- Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Trait-augmented games with limited-skill agents
- Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality
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