Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00090zbMath0962.91016MaRDI QIDQ4262876

Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00090

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationality; logical omniscience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B02: Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general)

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