Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00090MaRDI QIDQ4262876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Barton L. Lipman

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00090

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitylogical omniscience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02)

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Cited in

(22)

• Dealing with logical omniscience: expressiveness and pragmatics
• The logic of belief and belief change: a decision theoretic approach
• Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating
• Subjective expected utility with imperfect perception
• Why is language vague?
• Expected utility without parsimony
• Unawareness with ``possible possible worlds
• Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model
• Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
• Impossible worlds and partial belief
• Constructive decision theory
• Framing effects as violations of extensionality
• On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory
• Language-based decisions
• Bayesianism for non-ideal agents
• Fragmentation and logical omniscience
• Redoing the foundations of decision theory
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• QUANTIFIED LOGIC OF AWARENESS AND IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE WORLDS
• Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences
• Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
• A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality

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