Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality
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Publication:4262876
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00090zbMATH Open0962.91016OpenAlexW2034725308MaRDI QIDQ4262876FDOQ4262876
Authors: Barton L. Lipman 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00090
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Decision theory (91B06) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02)
Cited In (18)
- Dealing with logical omniscience: expressiveness and pragmatics
- The logic of belief and belief change: a decision theoretic approach
- Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating
- Subjective expected utility with imperfect perception
- Expected utility without parsimony
- Unawareness with ``possible possible worlds
- Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model
- Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
- Impossible worlds and partial belief
- Constructive decision theory
- Framing effects as violations of extensionality
- On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory
- Language-based decisions
- Fragmentation and logical omniscience
- Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
- QUANTIFIED LOGIC OF AWARENESS AND IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE WORLDS
- Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences
- Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
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