Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9393-0zbMATH Open1303.91046OpenAlexW2122891355MaRDI QIDQ490053FDOQ490053

Authors: Mareile Drechsler, Gerd Gigerenzer, Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos 

Publication date: 21 January 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0024-E82F-3

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zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityaxiomatizationEUTEVTpriority heuristic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

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• The role of aspiration level in risky choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory
• Generalized similarity judgements: An alternative explanation for choice anomalies
• Terrorism and probability neglect
• A further examination of cumulative prospect theory parameterizations
• One-reason decision-making: modeling violations of expected utility theory

Cited In (4)

• A contextual range-dependent model for choice under risk
• One-reason decision-making: modeling violations of expected utility theory
• Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality
• Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality

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