Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic
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Publication:490053
DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9393-0zbMath1303.91046OpenAlexW2122891355MaRDI QIDQ490053
Gerd Gigerenzer, Mareile Drechsler, Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos
Publication date: 21 January 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0024-E82F-3
Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)
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