Trait-Augmented Games with Limited-Skill Agents
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Publication:5013408
DOI10.1142/S0219198921500043zbMath1479.91006WikidataQ115029563 ScholiaQ115029563MaRDI QIDQ5013408
Michael Gmeiner, Val Eugene Lambson
Publication date: 30 November 2021
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500043
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