Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions
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Publication:1934165
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.035zbMath1255.91093OpenAlexW2015734379MaRDI QIDQ1934165
Publication date: 28 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.035
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Cites Work
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Dictatorial domains
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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