Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2431836
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0119-xzbMath1180.91112OpenAlexW2058073069MaRDI QIDQ2431836
Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0119-x
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
This page was built for publication: Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity