Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
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Publication:2431836
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0119-XzbMATH Open1180.91112OpenAlexW2058073069MaRDI QIDQ2431836FDOQ2431836
Authors: Dipjyoti Majumdar, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0119-x
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Dictatorial domains
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
Cited In (12)
- Recognizing top-monotonic preference profiles in polynomial time
- A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
- Update monotone preference rules
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods
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