Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.02.007MaRDI QIDQ2673213zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Achille Basile, Surekha Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao

Publication date 9 June 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.01552

zbMATH Keywords

anonymitynon-manipulabilityquota majoritysocial choice functionsvetoweak preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Abstract: Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indifference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula that is valid for all, and only, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice functions on V . The number of such functions is $2^{n+1}$ if V contains $n$ agents.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(16)

• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof
• Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
• An application of binomial coefficients to social choice theory
• The Limit of the Non-dictatorship Index
• A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions
• Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
• On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
• Two-valued strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions
• Isotone classes of social choice functions with binary range
• The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
• Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
• Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

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