Isotone classes of social choice functions with binary range

DOI10.3390/G15060043MaRDI QIDQ6954040zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Anna De Simone, Ciro Tarantino

Publication date 24 July 2025

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/G15060043

zbMATH Keywords

characterisotonicitynon-manipulabilitysocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
• On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
• Upper set rules with binary ranges

Cited in

(1)

• On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization

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