Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
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Cites work
- A Characterization of Weighted Voting
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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- Monetary policy by committee: consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority?
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- Simple games and magic squares
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- The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
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