Optimal voting rules
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Recommendations
Cited in
(46)- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Selecting a winner with external referees
- Voting
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Storable votes
- Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
- Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
- A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
- Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
- Voting with public information
- Voting with preferences over margins of victory
- Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
- Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747925 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- On the implementation of the median
- An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
- Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
- Linear voting rules
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
- Dynamically consistent voting rules
- Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
- Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
- Strategic vote trading under complete information
- Menu mechanisms
- Balanced voting
- Equitable Voting Rules
- Voting Rules from Random Relations
- Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
- Communication compatible voting rules
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Rationalizations of Voting Rules
- Rationalizable voting
- Efficient voting with penalties
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Dynamic communication mechanism design
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
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