Optimal voting rules

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW044MaRDI QIDQ4610839zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw044

zbMATH Keywords

dominant strategy implementationgeneralized mediansequential votingsingle-crossing preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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(47)

• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
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• Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
• Balanced voting
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
• Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
• Storable votes
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• On the implementation of the median
• Menu mechanisms
• Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
• Rationalizable voting
• Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
• Linear voting rules
• Voting Rules from Random Relations
• Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Voting
• Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747925 (Why is no real title available?)
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Selecting a winner with external referees
• A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
• Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
• Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
• Robustly optimal voting rule
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
• Dynamically consistent voting rules
• An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

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