Linear voting rules

DOI10.3982/ECTA16004MaRDI QIDQ4971286zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Hans Peter Grüner, Thomas Tröger

Publication date 12 October 2020

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/179364/1/18-01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingmechanism design without transferscostly participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Optimal voting rules
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

Cited in

(12)

• Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• The Linear Voting Model
• Dealing with expert bias in collective decision-making
• The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
• Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
• Participation in voting over budget allocations: a field experiment
• Balanced voting
• Large elections and interim turnout
• On the costly voting model: the mean rule
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
• The expressive power of voting rules

This page was built for publication: Linear voting rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4971286)