The expressive power of voting rules
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A NEW MEASURE OF RANK CORRELATION
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- Approval voting
- Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
- Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Is the preference of the majority representative?
- Making statements and approval voting
- Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
- The original Borda count and partial voting
- Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany
- Voting as Communicating
- Weighted distances between preferences
Cited in
(2)
This page was built for publication: The expressive power of voting rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6549138)
