Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation

DOI10.3982/ECTA8011MaRDI QIDQ3576883zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bruno Strulovici

Publication date 3 August 2010

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8011

zbMATH Keywords

banditexperimentationlearningreformsocial choicevoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(27)

• Social learning in a common interest voting game
• Hierarchical experimentation
• Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
• Keeping your options open
• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• The K-armed bandit problem with multiple priors
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
• Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
• Personal power dynamics in bargaining
• Learning, proximity and voting: theory and empirical evidence from nuclear referenda
• Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• Preemptive policy experimentation
• A voting architecture for the governance of free-driver externalities, with application to geoengineering
• Strategic experimentation in queues
• Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making
• DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION
• Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective
• Intervention uncertainty, household health, and pandemic
• Leadership ability and agenda choice
• Policy experimentation with repeated elections
• The expressive power of voting rules
• Experimentation in endogenous organizations
• Political brinkmanship and compromise
• Gradual learning from incremental actions
• A perpetual search for talents across overlapping generations: a learning process

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