The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.009MaRDI QIDQ290181zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jens Großer, Michael Seebauer

Publication date 1 June 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/stawi-ockenfels/pdf/wp_series_download/wp0064.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsCondorcet jury modelinformation search and aggregationvoluntary and compulsory votingvoting behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Information acquisition in committees
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Voting to tell others
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?

Cited in

(18)

• Correlation neglect in voting decisions: an experiment
• Jury voting without objective probability
• Rational ignorance and voting behavior
• Learning, proximity and voting: theory and empirical evidence from nuclear referenda
• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing
• Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation
• Why votes have value: instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
• The swing voter's curse in social networks
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
• Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
• Vote and voice: an experiment on the effects of inclusive governance rules
• The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE
• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q290181)