Jury voting without objective probability

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0918-ZMaRDI QIDQ258945zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors King King Li, Toru Suzuki

Publication date 10 March 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10453/77679

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• Conservativeness in jury decision-making
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood

Cites work

• An experimental study of collective deliberation
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory

Cited in

(6)

• The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
• Deliberative voting
• Conservativeness in jury decision-making
• Considerations on jury size and composition using lower probabilities
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries

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