Why votes have value: instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
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Publication:2442822
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Cites work
- Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
- Combinatorial auctions: a survey
- Computerizing politics
- Groupthink: Collective delusions in organizations and markets
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
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- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: a methodological inquiry and experimental test
- The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
- Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation
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