The original Borda count and partial voting

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0603-9zbMATH Open1287.91050OpenAlexW2071698610WikidataQ56553622 ScholiaQ56553622MaRDI QIDQ2452254FDOQ2452254

Authors: Peter Emerson 

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis

Cited In (22)

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• A novel ensemble based recommendation approach using network based analysis for identification of effective drugs for tuberculosis
• Approaching rank aggregation problems by using evolution strategies: the case of the optimal bucket order problem
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• A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems
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• Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting
• Using extension sets to aggregate partial rankings in a flexible setting
• Mean-based Borda count for paradox-free comparisons of optimization algorithms
• Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
• Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules
• Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
• Approaching the rank aggregation problem by local search-based metaheuristics
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• Distributed computation for marginal likelihood based model choice
• The expressive power of voting rules

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