A Borda count for partially ordered ballots

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0751-1MaRDI QIDQ404753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Cullinan, Samuel K. Hsiao, David Polett

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0751-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Partial orders, general (06A06)

Recommendations

• The original Borda count and partial voting
• Symmetry extensions of ``neutrality. II: Partial ordering of dictionaries
• Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• The Borda majority count

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1033382 (Why is no real title available?)
• Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures

Cited in

(12)

• Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
• Fine ballot numbers
• The Borda count and agenda manipulation
• The Borda count with weak preferences
• A unifying rank aggregation framework to suitably and efficiently aggregate any kind of rankings
• Symmetry extensions of ``neutrality. II: Partial ordering of dictionaries
• The Colley Method is an Extension of the Borda Count
• A stochastic dominance analysis of ranked voting systems with scoring
• A Borda count for collective sentiment analysis
• The original Borda count and partial voting
• The Borda majority count
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences

This page was built for publication: A Borda count for partially ordered ballots

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q404753)