Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
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Publication:6565778
DOI10.3982/TE4979MaRDI QIDQ6565778FDOQ6565778
Authors: Yiqiu Chen, Markus Möller 
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- School Choice with Consent*
- Truncation strategies in matching markets
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
- Essentially stable matchings
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- School choice under partial fairness
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Manipulability in school choice
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
- Obvious manipulations
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
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