Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

DOI10.3982/TE4979MaRDI QIDQ6565778zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yiqiu Chen, Markus Möller

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmanipulationregretschool choiceefficiency adjusted deferred acceptancestable-dominating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Manipulability in school choice
• Obvious manipulations
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• School Choice with Consent^*
• School choice under partial fairness
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• The instability of matching with overconfident agents
• Truncation strategies in matching markets

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