What you don't know can help you in school assignment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2178019
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Microeconomic theory
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice under partial fairness
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
Cited in
(13)- Information avoidance in school choice
- School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
- Smart matching platforms and heterogeneous beliefs in centralized school choice
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
- Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
- Manipulability in school choice
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
This page was built for publication: What you don't know can help you in school assignment
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2178019)