What you don't know can help you in school assignment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.014zbMath1437.91317OpenAlexW2963329642MaRDI QIDQ2178019

Thayer Morrill, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdeferred acceptanceschool assignmentmarked design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• Constrained school choice
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• School Choice with Consent^*
• School choice under partial fairness
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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