What you don't know can help you in school assignment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.014zbMATH Open1437.91317OpenAlexW2963329642MaRDI QIDQ2178019FDOQ2178019

Authors: Thayer Morrill, Umut Mert Dur 

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.014

Recommendations

• Constrained school choice
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdeferred acceptanceschool assignmentmarked design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Microeconomic theory
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Constrained school choice
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• School choice under partial fairness

Cited In (9)

• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
• Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
• Manipulability in school choice
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

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