What you don't know can help you in school assignment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.014MaRDI QIDQ2178019zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thayer Morrill, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date 7 May 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdeferred acceptanceschool assignmentmarked design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Constrained school choice
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained school choice
• Microeconomic theory
• School Choice with Consent^*
• School choice under partial fairness
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles

Cited in

(13)

• Information avoidance in school choice
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• Smart matching platforms and heterogeneous beliefs in centralized school choice
• Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
• Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
• Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
• Manipulability in school choice
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

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