Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00800-1MaRDI QIDQ2100097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Makoto Shimoji

Publication date 21 November 2022

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionheterogeneous beliefsmultiple receiversrationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cites work

• Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• Handbook of game theory. Vol. 4
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Maximal miscommunication
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Pivotal persuasion
• Potential games
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games
• Uniqueness of solution in linear programming

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(2)

• Setting an exam as an information design problem
• Information design for weighted voting

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