The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0328-8zbMath1282.91018OpenAlexW2120177315MaRDI QIDQ1939509

Ilan Adler

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0328-8

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingzero-sum gamesminimax theoremstrong dualityFarkas' lemmaVilles' theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Linear programming (90C05) 2-person games (91A05)

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Cites Work

• Polynomial algorithms for linear programming over the algebraic numbers
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