Setting an exam as an information design problem

DOI10.1111/IJET.12368MaRDI QIDQ6053636zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Makoto Shimoji

Publication date 23 October 2023

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12368

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasiongrade distributionheterogeneous beliefsmultiple receivers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Test design under voluntary participation
• Experimental design to persuade
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Optimal grading
• Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Competition in persuasion
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• Pivotal persuasion

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