Optimal grading

DOI10.1111/IERE.12121MaRDI QIDQ3459205zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robertas Zubrickas

Publication date 21 December 2015

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/59813/1/Zubrickas_Optimal_Grading.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ability signalinggrading rulehuman capital formationteacher-student relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Ability sorting and the returns to college major
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monopoly and product quality

Cited in

(13)

• Examination rules and student effort
• Students' social origins and targeted grading
• A theory of esteem based peer pressure
• Returns to skills, incentives to study and optimal educational standards
• Monopolistic signal provision
• Grade inflation due to selective averaging
• Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: the case of ``shrinkage estimators
• A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems
• Setting an exam as an information design problem
• Optimal grading contests
• Equilibrium grading policies with implications for female interest in STEM courses
• Selling signals
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?

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