Common Priors: A Reply to Gul

DOI10.2307/2999579MaRDI QIDQ4550999zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert J. Aumann

Publication date 4 September 2002

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2999579

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cited in

(17)

• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
• Countable spaces and common priors
• Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: a generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions
• Belief consistency and trade consistency
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study
• Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
• Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
• People with common priors can agree to disagree
• Arrow's theorem of the deductible with heterogeneous beliefs
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• How common are common priors?
• Uncommon priors require origin disputes

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