A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View

DOI10.2307/2999578MaRDI QIDQ4530921zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Faruk Gul

Publication date 28 May 2002

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2999578

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory (91B06)

Cited in

(24)

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
• Countable spaces and common priors
• Symposium: Logic and economics -- interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds
• Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: a generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions
• Belief consistency and trade consistency
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
• Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study
• Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
• Correlated-belief equilibrium
• Arrow's theorem of the deductible with heterogeneous beliefs
• Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Monologues, dialogues, and common priors
• The veil of public ignorance
• Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
• How common are common priors?
• Optimal stalling when bargaining
• Uncommon priors require origin disputes

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