Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
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Cites work
- A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
- Agreeing to disagree
- Almost common priors
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
- Limit-agreeing to disagree
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- Two modellings for theory change
- Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
- We can't disagree forever
Cited in
(11)- For Bayesian wannabes, are disagreements not about information?
- Disagreement is unpredictable.
- Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs
- Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
- Limit-agreeing to disagree
- Counterfactuals in ``agreeing to disagree type results
- People with common priors can agree to disagree
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- Strategic manipulation in Bayesian dialogues
- Weak agreement and the properties of beliefs under ambiguity
- Uncommon priors require origin disputes
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