A note on information revelation in procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.06.006MaRDI QIDQ709085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicola Doni, Domenico Menicucci

Publication date 15 October 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/pdf/wp01_2010.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversioninformation revelationlogconcavity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
• Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
• Biased procurement auctions
• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 858900 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3313523 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
• Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers

Cited in

(7)

• Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
• Biased procurement auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders
• Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
• A note on revelation of information for joint production
• Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions

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