Shuttle diplomacy

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105794MaRDI QIDQ6122072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piero Gottardi, Claudio Mezzetti

Publication date 27 March 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105794

zbMATH Keywords

diplomacyinformation designmechanism designmediation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution
• Mediation and peace
• Mediation and strategic delay in bargaining and markets
• Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication.

Cites work

• Asymmetric partnerships
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Mediation and peace
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
• Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust trading mechanisms
• Sequential information disclosure in auctions
• Sequential persuasion
• The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object

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