Two player bargaining model with outside subsidy

DOI10.1007/S10479-025-06640-6MaRDI QIDQ6835265zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ranjeet Rajput, Sri Vanamalla Venkataraman

Publication date 30 March 2026

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10479-025-06640-6

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingindividual rationalitymechanism designoutside subsidy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Contingent claim pricing through a continuous time variational bargaining scheme
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
• Remanufacturing with trade-ins under carbon regulations

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