Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
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Recommendations
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
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- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3573533 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1354815 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3281211 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Informed principal and countervailing incentives
- Informed principal with correlation
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
Cited in
(14)- Selling with evidence
- A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
- Verifiable disclosure
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
- Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
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