Reorganizing a partnership efficiently

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00266-3MaRDI QIDQ2149195zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric S. Chou, Meng-Yu Liang, Cheng-Tai Wu

Publication date 28 June 2022

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00266-3

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionpartnership dissolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
• Value of the status quo and efficient partnership dissolution
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality

Cites work

• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient trading with restriction
• Natural Oligopolies
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• Value of the status quo and efficient partnership dissolution

Cited in

(1)

• Efficiency in partnerships

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