Ideal default for resolving disputes efficiently
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Cites work
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
- Asymmetric partnerships
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Universal possibility and impossibility results
- Value of the status quo and efficient partnership dissolution
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
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