Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem
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Cites work
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3616126 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On cores and indivisibility
- Reducing Bias in a Personnel Assignment Process via Multiplicative Utility Solution
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(12)- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Exchange-stability in roommate problems
- Dynamic rank-maximal and popular matchings
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- House-swapping with divorcing and engaged pairs
- Bounded Unpopularity Matchings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111 (Why is no real title available?)
- Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange Problem
- Random popular matchings with incomplete preference lists
- Weighted popular matchings
- Bounded unpopularity matchings
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