On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.05.003zbMATH Open1279.91103OpenAlexW2054533924MaRDI QIDQ656783FDOQ656783

Flip Klijn

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/49174

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?

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